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A new software tool, called HEPTAD (Hospital Evacuation Planning Tool for Assis-
tance Devices), designed to aid evacuation planning in hospitals is described and
demonstrated in this article. The software can identify regions within a hospital
geometry that are inappropriate for patients who require the use of specific move-
ment assistance devices in the event of an emergency evacuation. Using the soft-
ware, Hospital Emergency Coordinators can reduce the risk of allocating a bed to a
patient from which they cannot be evacuated within a safe time. In addition, HEP-
TAD is designed to be a proof of concept for algorithms that will later be incorpo-
rated within the EXODUS egress model. HEPTAD utilises several techniques from
autonomous robotics to generate the fastest viable egress route for movement assis-
tance devices from every location in the geometry while considering device spatial
constraints (size and shape) and kinematic constraints (maximum speeds, turning
radius and holonomicity). It then uses the egress time of this route along with factors
from space syntax (isovist and spaciousness) to analyse the emergency vulnerability
of every location within the geometry.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Between April 2010 and April 2018, there was an average of approxi-
mately 750 serious fires in hospitals and medical care facilities per
year in England alone and on average one fire-related casualty in
every 20 of these fires.1 Many fires in hospitals require a progressive
horizontal evacuation of patients to a neighbouring fire compartment
with the use of their hospital bed. However, full evacuations of hospi-
tals are sometimes required, such as the 2008 Royal Marsden fire in
London, UK2,3 and the 16 full evacuations of hospitals after the 2016
Kumamoto earthquake in Japan.4 Many of these evacuations required
the vertical movement of patients with specialised movement assis-
tance devices due to their mobility requirements. Therefore, the suc-
cess of full evacuations depends greatly on assistance from staff and
their use of these devices.5
It is widely agreed that evacuation plans and the layout of hospi-
tal facilities should be designed with movement assistance devices in
mind.6,7 It is therefore critical to fully understand the variety of assis-
tance devices in use to develop effective evacuation plans. These
assistance devices, such as evacuation chairs, hospital beds, wheel-
chairs, rescue sheets and stretchers, vary significantly in terms of
their spatial constraints (size and shape) and kinematic constraints
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(movement speed, acceleration and manoeuvrability).3,8,9 This means
the route with the shortest evacuation time from each room may dif-
fer depending on the device in use. Therefore, current factors used
to determine shortest evacuation routes throughout a geometry,
such as the position of fire hazards and the presence of other evacu-
ating occupants, may not be sufficient and device constraints should
also be taken into account. In addition, the impact of fire hazards on
viable exit routes may be dependent on the nature of the device
employed due to various performance constraints associated with
the device.
Patients who require the use of specific assistance devices during
an evacuation must not be located in areas where they cannot be
manoeuvred to an exit/safe area in less time than the ASET (available
safe egress time10) of the scenario when using the device. These inap-
propriate areas can be estimated by analysing the egress time
required with the use of the device in the absence of interactions with
other evacuating occupants.
The research presented here outlines a new technique for
obtaining an individual value of emergency vulnerability (IVEV) for every
point in a building geometry. This has been implemented into a soft-
ware tool named HEPTAD (Hospital Evacuation Planning Tool for
Assistance Devices) that can aid Hospital Emergency Coordinators
(HECs) by determining the areas of the geometry that are inappropri-
ate for patients based on the assistance devices used. The IVEV is cal-
culated for each type of assistance device by assessing the viable
egress routes for the device from every point in the geometry.
The tool can also be utilised to test the suitability of egress routes
for an assistance device under different scenarios as part of a risk
assessment exercise (such as a Qualitative Design Review7) and deter-
mine alternative egress routes if the primary one becomes blocked.
Furthermore, real-time applications of the methodology could be
developed to identify alternative, viable, near-optimal evacuation
routes during an actual incident should the preferred evacuation route
be compromised. This has become particularly relevant in recent years
due to a growing interest in developing autonomous robotic move-
ment assistance devices, such as hospital beds,11,12 wheelchairs12 and
stretchers,13 that can be utilised to autonomously transport patients
throughout hospitals during an evacuation. In addition to these appli-
cations, HEPTAD provides a proof of concept for theoretical models
that will later be incorporated into the EXODUS egress model.14
2 | BACKGROUND
Many patients may have specific medical constraints which limit the
type of assistance device that can be employed to take them to a
place of safety during an emergency. As a result, Florida Department
of Health15 has suggested conducting a ‘patient movement study,
based on the number and type of patient to be moved from which
locations’ to determine the distribution of devices throughout a hospi-
tal. There is, however, no guarantee that because a patient is near an
appropriate assistance device, their egress time will be below the
ASET. Therefore, it may be imperative to have one step before the
patient movement study to first allocate beds to patients based on
the expected egress time for an appropriate assistance device from
that location.
To achieve an appropriate allocation of beds, it is essential to
have a good understanding of the egress time for each device from
every location within the geometry under likely evacuation scenarios.
However, traditional methods to determine the egress time of assis-
tance devices, such as drills or physical trials, can be costly, time-
consuming and potentially hazardous.7 Furthermore, given that hospi-
tals and care homes are occupied 24 hours a day, any physical trial is
often constrained by the requirements of the occupants. One solution
is to use a modelling approach; however, HECs have relied on limited
modelling tools to plan for the use and distribution of devices.6,16
These tools have consisted of several hand calculation and simulation
models that have limitations in their scope and accuracy.
Two hand calculation models have been developed to assess the
vulnerability of areas of a geometry during an evacuation. The first,
developed by Ünlü et al,17 has used several space syntax variables to
give an estimate of the vulnerability of each area in the geometry.
However, this model does not consider routes that are viable for peo-
ple with reduced mobility and instead assumes a homogenous popula-
tion. Taking this one step further, the second model, by Hashemi,18
has calculated an accessibility index for each corridor, ramp, doorway,
stairway and lift in the geometry for wheelchair users based on a
weighted sum of relevant variables for each entity (such as the width
and length of a corridor and the width of a doorway). A coarse net-
work has then been constructed with each arc representing a corridor,
ramp, doorway, stairway or lift and each node representing junctions
between two arcs. Dijkstra's algorithm19 has then been used to find
the egress route that minimises the total accessibility index from each
node in the geometry. These models, however, do not differentiate
between assistance devices that may be utilised during an evacuation
so cannot be used to determine which devices are suitable from dif-
ferent start locations.
To determine the most suitable assistance devices for a hospital,
there have been only two hand calculation tools made available to
HECs. The first, by the United States Department of Homeland
Security,20 has provided a metric for analysing the performance of
possible assistance devices based on a weighted sum of several sub-
jective factors obtained from focus groups. The second, by Hunt
et al,8,9 has provided a metric that also includes empirically obtained
performance factors such as horizontal and vertical movement speeds,
number of operators and space occupied. Neither of these tools, how-
ever, identify the unsafe areas of the hospital for each evacuating
patient based on their mobility requirements.
Hunt9 has also developed a theoretical model to analyse geome-
tries and produce viable routes for assistance devices by taking into
account their spatial constraints (size and shape). The model analyses
the width of each corridor and narrow gap in the geometry and
marks it as impassable if its width is less than the width of the
device. The model goes on to mark any 90 corner as impassable by
analytically determining if the device can traverse it based on its
length and width. Thus, when attempting to find viable routes,
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Hunt's model represents assistance devices as rectangles for 90
corners and circles elsewhere. These spatial representations fail to
consider any other shape that may restrict the available viable routes
of a device. In addition, Hunt's model does not provide much addi-
tional information about the accessibility of routes for a compliant
hospital geometry. This is because the minimum possible width of an
egress route within a compliant hospital geometry in the UK is
1200 mm for both hospital beds and general traffic (calculated from
the Health Technical Memorandum 05-027 and the Health Building
Note 00-0421) which is wider than a typical assistance device that
may be utilised. In addition, any 90 corner in an egress route must
be able to accommodate a hospital bed's length and width when a
bed is used and a wheelchair's length and width (with an attendant)
for general traffic. As assistance devices can generally be grouped
into prone devices (such as stretchers and rescue sheets) with similar
dimensions to a hospital bed or seated devices (such as, carry chairs
and evacuation chairs) with similar dimensions to a wheelchair, any
analysis of a compliant egress route with this model will likely return
as passable for any of these assistance devices.
A potential problem with compliant egress routes that has been
overlooked by Hunt's model9 concerns the kinematic constraints of
devices. These kinematic constraints dictate how an assistance device
can manoeuvre through a geometry, further restricting available
routes. The main kinematic constraints that impact an assistance
device's manoeuvrability are its minimum turning radius and
holonomicity. The holonomicity of a device is a measure of whether it
can move in any direction without first rotating.22 For example, a
stretcher can move in any direction without the need to rotate, while
a wheelchair will have to rotate to change direction (other than
reversing). Thus, the stretcher, a holonomic device, is not as con-
strained as the wheelchair, a non-holonomic device. A non-holonomic
device may not be able to traverse a 90 corner even if an analysis of
its length and width by Health Building Note 00-0421 or Hunt's
model9 returns as passable. This limited representation of spatial and
kinematic constraints in Hunt's model9 may result in the prediction of
unrealistic routes in some geometries leading to unreliable qualitative
and quantitative results.
Hunt's model9 has been implemented in the Pathfinder23 and
EXODUS8,9,14 evacuation simulation models. Therefore, unlike most
evacuation models that have been unable to represent assistance
devices,3,9 Pathfinder and EXODUS have been able to explicitly repre-
sent some of the spatial constraints that have an impact on the route
finding (and therefore egress time) of devices. Although they make
use of the same methods for assistance devices, these models differ
in the way they represent geometries. Pathfinder represents geome-
tries as continuous spaces in which occupants, represented as circles,
navigate using a navigation mesh.23 By contrast, EXODUS discretises
the geometry into a network of nodes and arcs arranged in a fine grid
with a default spacing of 0.5 × 0.5 m representing the space taken up
by an occupant. Therefore, each node can be occupied by at most one
occupant at a time and each occupant must occupy exactly one node.
Each node is connected to its eight (or less) neighbours with arcs all-
owing occupants to jump from node to node. Walls and obstacles are
marked with boundary lines. Occupants move through this network
towards an exit or goal using a potential map.14 This network repre-
sentation of the geometry is mirrored by HEPTAD. An example geom-
etry as represented in EXODUS is shown in Figure 1.
In addition to the underlying limitations in Hunt's model,9 neither
Pathfinder nor EXODUS has been able to predict the required egress
time for an assistance device from every location in the geometry
without individually simulating the movement from each location. This
means, although they have been used to verify an existing evacuation
plan, they are inefficient at determining a safe distribution of patients
within a hospital.
Ronchi et al24 have suggested that features based on fields of
study outside of fire safety engineering are often relevant to evacua-
tion modelling. Following this principle, this research has looked at
methods from two external fields of study, autonomous robotics and
space syntax, with the aim to solve limitations with existing models
and add functionality to the EXODUS egress model. Particular interest
has been placed on recent work in the field of autonomous robotics,
where, through the use of a network embedded in C-Space, the most
relevant spatial and kinematic constraints of autonomous robots have
been represented.25
F IGURE 1 Example geometry in EXODUS with boundary lines (marking the walls of the geometry), nodes (green squares), arcs (connecting
the nodes), occupants (blue and pink circles) and an exit. A, Before simulation. B, During simulation
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3 | THEORETICAL MODEL
3.1 | C-Space network
The first method incorporated into HEPTAD is from the field of
autonomous robotics and consists of representing each Degree Of
Freedom (DOF) of the assistance device in a C-Space (configuration
space).22 In this context (a 2D rigid body navigating a 2D geometry),
the C-Space represents the collection of points describing every pos-
sible position and orientation of a given object within a given geome-
try. Every point in the C-Space, therefore, consists of an x and y
coordinate describing the location of a reference point on the device
and an angle representing the orientation of the device around this
point. The C-Space is, therefore, a three-dimensional space. Multi-
floor structures can be represented with this method by including an
additional dimension isomorphic to Z, representing the floor number.
However, stairways are not yet represented in HEPTAD, so a three-
dimensional space is utilised in this work. The method utilised in this
research discretises this space into a network of nodes and arcs
through which the device can navigate. This technique has been
shown to work well when path planning for robots in ‘close proximity’
environments, for example, an improvised explosive device disposal
robot.25 This has an analogy to the movement of assistance devices
through narrow corridors and doorways.
To construct the C-Space, the geometry is first represented as a
collection of boundary lines marking out the walls and obstacles in the
building. The version of HEPTAD presented in this article is limited to
single floor structures giving three DOF. These are the spatial coordi-
nates of a reference point on the device (x and y position) and the
angular orientation around this point (θ measured clockwise in
degrees from the positive y axis). This means that any configuration
(position and orientation) in the geometry can be represented by the
three coordinates (x, y, θ). A 3D C-Space is constructed for each
assistance device where every ~x,~y,~zð Þ coordinate in this space repre-
sents exactly one (x, y, θ) configuration in the geometry where ~x= x
[in metres], ~y = y [in metres] and ~z= θ [in degrees]. Note that 0 is iden-
tified with 360 on the ~z axis (ie, it is modular 360) making it isomor-
phic to the unit circle S1. An example of how configurations in the
geometry are represented in C-Space is shown in Figure 2.
To enable the incorporation of spatial and kinematic constraints
into C-Space, some form of discretisation must be performed on this
space. To achieve this, a 3D network is embedded in the 3D C-Space.
Each node n in this network has a position ~x,~y,~zð Þ in C-Space that cor-
responds to exactly one configuration (x, y, θ) in the geometry. The
nodes are placed in a 3D grid with a spacing of 0.25 × 0.25 on the ~x,~y
plane of and a spacing of 22.5 on the ~z axis. The spacing on the ~x,~y
plane is chosen to be twice the resolution of the default network
structure in EXODUS so it can be obtained from this network by per-
forming a barycentric subdivision26. This is to allow for easy communi-
cation between the nodes in HEPTAD and the nodes in EXODUS to
prepare for merging the two models. The spacing on the ~z axis pro-
vides 16 possible orientations. The number of orientations can be
edited by changing this spacing.
For a geometry that can be contained in the rectangle [E, W] ×
[S, N]  R2 on the real plane (for some N, S, E, W  R with E < W and
S < N), a node is placed in C-Space at position (0.25i, 0.25j, 22.5k) for all i,
j, k  Z such that 4E ≤ i ≤ 4W, 4S ≤ j ≤ 4N and 0 ≤ k < 16. These nodes
form a 3D grid with an ~x spacing of 0.25, a ~y spacing of 0.25 and a ~z
spacing of 22.5. The nodes can be viewed as a collection of 16 layers
where each layer represents one θ orientation (ie, one ~z value). This
structure is shown in Figure 3. Note that the network embedded in C-
Space does not have to form a regular grid. Once HEPTAD is incorpo-
rated into EXODUS, the underlying 2D network in EXODUS can be
utilised to construct a corresponding 3D network in HEPTAD.
To simplify notation, for two configurations c1 = (x1, y1, θ1) and
c2 = (x2, y2, θ2), let dx,y c1,c2ð Þ≔
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
x2−x1ð Þ2 + y2−y1ð Þ2
q
and dθ(c1, c2)
F IGURE 2 Representation of the same two configurations of an assistance device (red and blue) as shapes in the geometry and points in
C-Space
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≔min(θ2−1, θ1−2) where θ2−1 and θ1−2 are the smallest positive real
numbers such that θ1 + θ2−1 θ2 (mod 360) and θ2 + θ1
−2 θ1 (mod 360). In other words, dx, y(c1, c2) denotes the Euclidian
distance between the x, y positions represented by c1 and c2 and
dθ(c1, c2) denotes the minimum amount of rotation between the θ ori-
entations represented by c1 and c2 (anticlockwise or clockwise).
For all pairs of nodes n1 and n2 in the network that represent configu-
rations c1 and c2, respectively, two directed arcs a1 = (n1, n2) and a2 = (n2,




and dθ(c1, c2) ≤22.5. In other words, each node is connected to its
eight neighbours on the same layer (as shown in Figure 4A), and the
nine nodes directly above and nine nodes directly below these neigh-
bours (as shown in Figure 4B). This gives each non-boundary node a
collection of arcs that corresponded to eight linear directions and two
angular directions (clockwise and anticlockwise) in the geometry. This
results in eight arcs that represent a linear movement with no rotation,
eight arcs that represent a linear movement with a clockwise rotation,
eight arcs that represent a linear movement with an anticlockwise rota-
tion and two arcs that represent a rotation with no linear movement.
This is a total of 26 directional arcs per non-boundary node.
3.2 | Representing constraints
The most relevant spatial constraints (size and shape) and kinematic
constraints (turning radius and holonomicity) of an assistance device are
represented by editing the C-Space network. Spatial constraints have
been commonly represented in C-Space by taking the Minkowski sum22
of the boundary lines with the device shape for each orientation. This
can be thought of as shrinking the device down to a single point while
F IGURE 3 Two views of the 3D grid of nodes (represented as green spheres) embedded in C-Space for an example geometry. The nodes that
lie outside of the geometry have been removed
F IGURE 4 Connectivity of a
node in C-Space. A, Connections
within same layer of C-Space. B,
Connections with layer above and
below in C-Space
JOYCE ET AL. 5
inflating the boundary lines. The result of doing this is a 3D volume in
C-Space that marks out the invalid configurations, that is, the configura-
tions that would result in a collision with a boundary line. As the repre-
sentation of C-Space is discretised into a network, the nodes that sit
inside this Minkowski sum (and therefore represent an invalid configu-
ration) are removed from the network. All remaining nodes in the
C-Space network represent valid configurations, that is, configurations
that do not cause a collision with a boundary line.
The representation of the kinematic constraints is produced in a
similar fashion by removing all directed arcs in the network that rep-
resented an invalid movement. If the device is unable to turn on
the spot (has a non-zero minimum turning radius), all arcs that rep-
resent a rotation with no linear movement are removed. That is, all
directed arcs that represent a movement from configuration (x1,
y1, θ1) to (x2, y2, θ2) such that x1 = x2 and y1 = y2 are removed. To
represent a non-holonomic device (in this context, a device whose
linear movement direction must be equal to the direction it is fac-
ing), all arcs that cause a linear movement whose direction differs
from the current orientation by more than some tolerance are
removed. So, given a tolerance of ε degrees, an arc that represents
a movement from configuration (x1, y1, θ1) to (x2, y2, θ2) is removed
if the inequality in Equation (1) is true. A value of ε = 22.5 is used
here to ensure that every movement direction is valid for at least
one orientation. Figure 5 shows a sample of nodes in C-Space with
the same ~x,~yð Þ position with their connected arcs after this process
has been performed. Note that there are 16 possible orientations but
only 8 possible movement directions, hence some orientations will lie
halfway between two movement directions. When this is the case,
both movement directions will be valid. For example, when θ = 67.5
there are two possible movement directions from each node (45 and
90) as they are both within the tolerance. This is shown in Figure 5.
dθ θ1, tan




3.3 | Route finding
One benefit of embedding a network in C-Space is that route finding
is relatively simple. Given the target nodes (exits) and appropriate
weights for each arc, Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm19 is used to
determine the egress time from each node in the network and the
quickest route from that node to an exit. Since the nodes and arcs
that represent invalid configurations and movements have been
removed, the resulting routes automatically abide by the spatial and
kinematic constraints of the device. This means after running
F IGURE 5 Remaining arcs for
a non-holonomic device after
kinematic constraints have been
applied. Left: 16 nodes
representing different
orientations and the same (x,y)
position with arcs connected to
the same layer (black) and
neighbouring layers (grey).
Middle: four sections of the left
figure. Right: corresponding
orientation of the device for each
section
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Dijkstra's algorithm once on the C-Space network, a viable route is
found from every start location in the geometry to the nearest exit,
removing the need for repeated simulations from each start location.
The weight of each arc takes into account the maximum linear
speed sL
max and maximum angular speed sA
max of the assistance
device. The weight of an arc a that represents a movement from con-











The weight of each arc is the time taken for the device to move
from the first configuration to the second under the assumption that






where tL is the time taken to move the linear
distance dx, y(c1, c2) at linear speed sL
max and tA is the time taken to
move the angular distance dθ(c1, c2) at angular speed sA
max. With these
weightings, the resulting potential on each node from Dijkstra's algo-
rithm is the time for the device to get from the configuration repre-
sented by that node to the nearest exit travelling at its maximum
linear and angular speeds. Acceleration and deceleration are also con-
sidered by increasing the weight of an arc during Dijkstra's algorithm
when the direction of the current shortest path changes. This takes
the slowing of the device into account when it changes movement
direction. This method is an extension of that used by Hashemi18 to
decrease the accessibility of an egress route in the geometry every
time it traverses a corner. The potential on each node after Dijkstra's
algorithm is the time taken for the device to get from the configura-
tion represented by the node to the nearest exit.
3.4 | Individual value of emergency vulnerability
The concept of a value of emergency vulnerability (VEV), proposed by
Ünlü et al,17 has, in the past, taken into account five factors; real
integration (a measure of how isolated the location is), isovist (area of
geometry visible from the location), distance (distance to an exit),
queuing crowd (density of people in the location) and spaciousness
(how much space is available around the location, that is, the floor
area of the room containing the location). For each location in the
geometry, HEPTAD calculates the spaciousness and isovist factors
and utilises the egress time from this location (or nearest node in
C-Space) to represent both the real integration and distance factors.
The queuing crowd factor will be represented by the interactions with
occupants when the HEPTAD algorithms are incorporated into
EXODUS. Therefore, as the interactions with other occupants are not
currently taken into account, HEPTAD produces the IVEV for every
position in the geometry and not the full VEV.
To gain a value for each of the three factors (egress time, spa-
ciousness and isovist), the 2D floor plan is discretised into
0.25m × 0.25m cells so that the centre of each cell has the same (x, y)
position as the ~x,~yð Þ position of nodes in C-Space, that is, at
(0.25i, 0.25j) for all i, jZ such that 4E≤ i≤4W and 4S≤ j≤4N. This
means that each cell corresponds to at most 16 nodes in C-Space with
the same ~x,~yð Þ coordinates. This number will be less than 16 if some
of the nodes were deleted when representing the spatial constraints.
The cells for an example geometry are shown in Figure 6. The egress
time T of a cell is the average egress time (in seconds) over these
nodes. The isovist I is the total area (in metres squared) visible from
the centre of the cell, calculated by casting rays from the centre of the
cell and testing for intersections with boundary lines. Each ray has a
maximum length equal to a maximum visibility distance v. The spa-
ciousness S is a measure of the proportion of valid orientations at the
position represented by the centre of the cell, calculated by taking the
total number of nodes that correspond to the cell (that have not been
deleted) and dividing by 16.
To calculate the IVEV, a dimensionless value is constructed for
each factor then a weighted sum is taken. The dimensionless values
lie between 0 and 1 such that 0 is the least vulnerable for that factor
F IGURE 6 Discretisation of geometry into cells with centre equal to the (x,y) position of nodes. Cells are shown in the geometry (left) and
C-Space (right)
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and 1 is the most vulnerable. The dimensionless egress time is
T̂ = TASET−Prep:−Resp: where ASET is the available safe egress time
(obtained from fire models or risk assessments), ‘Prep.’ is the prepara-
tion time for the assistance device and ‘Resp.’ is the longest possible
response time of staff. The dimensionless spaciousness is Ŝ= 1−S .
Finally, the dimensionless isovist is Î=1− I
πv2 where v is the maximum
visibility distance. With these values, the IVEV is calculated with
Equation (3) where weights wT, wS and wI (such that wT+wS+wI = 1)
represent how much the egress time, spaciousness and isovist factors
(respectively) influence the vulnerability of a location. Weights of




Hazards (such as fire, smoke or debris) are represented in HEPTAD as
regions of the geometry where the assistance device cannot go. Once
their position is defined in the geometry, they can be made active or
inactive and the egress routes are recalculated accordingly giving new
egress times and, therefore, IVEVs. Note that HEPTAD assesses the
vulnerability of locations in the geometry during an evacuation and
does not assess the likelihood of an evacuation taking place. There-
fore, each hazard receives a probability value that is a prediction of
the likelihood the hazard is active given an evacuation is taking place.
This probability can be predicted through risk assessment exercises.
The model assumes that at most one hazard can be active at any time,
so the sum of the probabilities of the hazards must be ≤1. For n haz-
ards H1, H2, …, Hn with respective probabilities P1, P2, …, Pn, the empty
hazard H0 representing no hazard (eg, in a non-emergency evacuation)




With this probability measure, a weighted average of the IVEV
is calculated called the averaged individual value of emergency vul-
nerability (aIVEV). To simplify notation, let T(i) and IVEV(i) denote
the egress time and IVEV of a cell (respectively) with hazard i





IVEV ið ÞPi ð4Þ
In addition to the aIVEV, the individual required safe egress time
(IRSET) for each device is considered to aid in deciding the vulnerabil-
ity of areas of the geometry. That is, the total egress time (from alarm
activation to escape) for the assistance device from that location if
evacuating on its own. Let the IRSET for hazard i be denoted IRSET
(i) = T(i) + Prep. + Resp. where ‘Prep.’ is the preparation time for the
device and ‘Resp.’ is the longest possible response time of staff. This
value provides a useful benchmark to show the longest RSET possible
for the device from the location in the absence of interactions with
other evacuating occupants. The actual longest RSET experienced in a
full building evacuation will likely be greater than this. The maximum
individual required safe egress time (mIRSET), representing the maxi-




IRSET ið Þð Þ ð5Þ
3.6 | Results interpretation
To determine the distribution of patients throughout the hospital,
both the aIVEV and the mIRSET are considered. No patient should be
placed in an area whose mIRSET for the assistance device they require
is greater than the ASET for a predicted scenario. In addition, patients
should not be placed in an area with an aIVEV of more than the egress
time weighting wT. This is because, if aIVEV ≥ wT, then this location is
at least as vulnerable as a location with the smallest dimensionless
spaciousness and isovist (Ŝ=0 and Î= 0) and the largest dimensionless
egress time (T̂ =1). When this is the case, the mIRSET will be greater
than the ASET. Therefore, if aIVEV≥wT, the location is at least as vul-
nerable as a location where the mIRSET is greater than the ASET. As a
result, the actual mIRSET of the location may be beyond the mIRSET
predicted by HEPTAD. This could be because it is difficult to manoeu-
vre the device into the area (low spaciousness) or for staff to notice
the patient (low isovist); increasing the response time. For each
device, areas of the geometry are colour coded to produce risk zones
using the following heuristic:
• Areas with mIRSET ≥ ASET are marked as red risk zones: patients
requiring this device should never be placed in these areas.
• Areas that are not red risk zones but with aIVEV ≥ wT are marked
as amber risk zones: patients requiring this device should not be
placed in these areas. However, these zones can be upgraded to
green risk zones if measures are put in place to improve the visibil-
ity of the patient (to increase the isovist) and/or provide a clearer
path for the device to enter and exit the zone (to increase the
spaciousness).
• All areas that are not red or amber risk zones are marked as green
risk zones: patients requiring this device should, where possible, be
allocated beds in these risk zones. Within these zones, areas with a
lower mIRSET and aIVEV scores should be prioritised and further
analysis may be required to take into account other evacuating
people.
Note that HEPTAD does not currently take into account the
impact of other occupants during the evacuation in its calculation of
risk zones. Thus, while HEPTAD can be used to identify inappropriate
areas for a particular patient, it cannot alone be used to determine the
appropriate areas that can be evacuated within a given ASET. In other
words, all appropriate areas will lie within green risk zones but not all
green risk zones are appropriate areas. To determine which areas in
green risk zones are appropriate, further analysis is required that takes
into account the impact of other occupants during the evacuation in
8 JOYCE ET AL.
addition to the aIVEV and mIRSET values from HEPTAD. The impact
of other occupants during the evacuation will be represented when
HEPTAD is incorporated into the EXODUS egress model.
4 | TEST CASE
To demonstrate the functionality of HEPTAD, a test case of a hypothet-
ical hospital layout was constructed along with several scenarios. Only
the ground floor of the building was considered as HEPTAD does not
yet have the functionality to include stairways. The floor plan is shown
in Figure 7. The usable space in this geometry was input into HEPTAD
with 16 rooms (R1-16), 4 external exits (E1-4) and an internal exit (E5).
The hypothetical layout is based on a hospital geometry that was in use
up to 1986. As such, many of the doorways are not code compliant7,21
by modern standards as they have an effective width of only 1000 mm.
However, code-compliant evacuation routes do exist from R3, R8, R9,
R10 and the main corridor. This mix of compliant and non-compliant
areas of the geometry is designed to test HEPTAD's ability to determine
viable evacuation routes in both areas for different assistance devices
and show the effect compliancy has for different devices.
Three hazards were added to the geometry each with its probabil-
ity of being active during an evacuation. Two of these hazards were
added at either end of the geometry blocking main exists and one in
the middle blocking the main corridor. These locations were chosen to
demonstrate the impact each hazard has on its surrounding area. For
the scenarios represented by the hazards, an ASET of 150 seconds
and a response time of 50 seconds were assumed. These scenarios
were selected for demonstration purposes only. The hazards and
room labelling are shown in Figure 8 and the hazard information is
shown in Table 1.
Within this geometry and set of scenarios, three different assis-
tance devices were compared. These were an evacuation chair (EC),
rescue sheet (RS) and hospital bed (HB). Most of the parameters for
these devices were either taken directly from data collected by Adams
and Galea3,8,9 and Hoondert et al27 or inferred from these data. How-
ever, due to a lack of available data, the rest were estimated based on
video footage and photographs. As such, these parameters, presented
in Table 2, are for demonstration purposes only. A photograph of each
device along with its 2D representation in HEPTAD is shown in
Figure 9.
5 | RESULTS
5.1 | Base case (no hazards)
The building geometry was input into HEPTAD along with the proper-
ties of the assistance devices. The value of isovist, spaciousness,
egress time and IVEV were collected for each 0.25m × 0.25m cell in
the geometry. For the scenario with hazard 0 (no hazards), the isovist
for the geometry is presented in Figure 10 and spaciousness for each
device are presented in Figure 11 (EC), Figure 12 (RS) and Figure 13
(HB) as heat maps. The average IRSET and IVEV values for each room
are presented as bar charts in Figure 14.
The isovist and spaciousness values were found to be lower near
the perimeter of rooms as boundary lines obstruct the assistance
device and reduce the visibility of surrounding areas. These values
were also generally lower in smaller or narrower areas such as corri-
dors or small rooms. This results in an increase in IVEV in smaller or
narrower areas and near boundaries.
The data collected from HEPTAD suggested that the EC per-
formed better than the RS and HB for all factors (spaciousness, egress
time, IRSET and IVEV) for all rooms. This was not surprising when
considering the EC's smaller size, larger linear and angular speeds and
shorter preparation time compared to the other devices. The RS had a
F IGURE 7 Hypothetical geometry used in the test case
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lower egress time than the HB for most rooms despite being a non-
holonomic device while the HB was holonomic. This was likely due to
the slightly smaller size and faster linear and angular speeds. However,
when considering the IRSET and IVEV, the HB performed better in
most rooms. This was due to the relatively short preparation time
experienced by the HB compared to the RS (22 seconds shorter).
It can be seen from Figure 14 that the RS and HB had a relatively
long egress time for rooms R15 and R16 while the EC had a relatively
short egress time. This was because, unlike the EC, the RS and HB
could not manoeuvre through the small gap next to E4 so had to use a
different exit. This difference in viable routes was reiterated when
looking at the egress route taken by all three devices from the same
configuration in the top right of the geometry (R10) as shown in
Figure 15. The routes from this location had an egress time of
18 seconds for the EC, 42 seconds for the RS and 52 seconds for the
HB. This difference is partly due to the EC exiting through E5 while
the RS and HB exited through E3 giving a much longer egress route
from the same location. In addition, the RS and HB used a different
door to exit R10, the RS utilising a code-compliant7,21 doorway (width
2000 mm) and the HB utilising a non-compliant doorway (width
1000 mm). This highlights the potential difference in available routes
for holonomic and non-holonomic assistance devices.
Based on the values produced by HEPTAD (determined by the
thresholds in Figure 14), all 16 rooms were green risk zones for a
patient requiring an EC compared to 13 for a HB and only 5 rooms for
F IGURE 8 Geometry represented in HEPTAD with rooms (R1-16), exits (E1-5) and hazards (red) (H1-3)








0 No hazard 22 0.0
1 Fire between R1 and R2
blocking E2
33 15.25
2 Fire in storage cupboard to
the right of R6 blocking
the main corridor
25 11.0
3 Fire in storage cupboard
next to E4 blocking this exit
20 10.25
TABLE 2 Properties of devices (for demonstration purposes only)








































at front (able to
move around
device)27a
aValue inferred from data in reference.
bValue estimated through observations of video footage and photographs.
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a RS. The number of red, amber and green risk zones differed, how-
ever, when hazards were considered.
5.2 | Effect of hazards
For each hazard entered into HEPTAD, egress routes from every loca-
tion were recalculated giving different egress times and IVEVs. If a
base case route travelled through a hazard, the route of the assistance
device was altered to avoid the hazard which may have caused it to
use an alternative exit. The effects of each hazard on the IVEVs are
shown in Figure 16.
From Figure 16, hazard 1 affected R1, R2, R3, R4 and R5. Aver-
aged over the devices, the increase in IVEV for these rooms was
0.004, 0.232, 0.039, 0.018 and 0.002, respectively. From these values,
it can be seen that the effect on R2 is much larger than that on the
other rooms. This was likely due to the proximity of the hazard to this
room and the large distance from this room to the next nearest avail-
able exit (E3 or E5). Likewise, hazard 2 had the largest effect on the
IVEVs of R7 and hazard 3 had the largest effect on the IVEVs of R16.
As well as increasing the distance to a viable exit, hazards were
also seen to trap devices in a room (giving infinite egress time). In this
test case, the HB was the only device trapped by a hazard. This was
because its larger size reduced its ability to manoeuvre around haz-
ards, increasing the probability of a trap occurring. These traps
occurred in R7 when hazard 2 was active and R16 when hazard 3 was
active. The trapping in R7 can be seen in Figure 16 by the increase in
IVEV (of 0.322) for R7 by hazard 1. However, Figure 16 shows only a
F IGURE 9 Photographs9,27 and corresponding 2D representations of the assistance devices. Blue area(s) denote attendant(s), grey area
denotes the device and arrow shows forward direction. A, Evacuation device. B, Rescue sheet. C, Hospital bed
F IGURE 10 The isovist for the geometry
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small increase in IVEV (of 0.042) for R16 by hazard 3. This small
increase is because of the already high IVEV for the HB in that room
(0.880) in the base case caused by its inability to use E4.
Hazards 1 and 2 had little effect on the IVEV of the EC when
compared to the other devices. This was because the alternative
routes from R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7 could be traversed by
F IGURE 11 The spaciousness for the evacuation chair
F IGURE 12 The spaciousness for the rescue sheet
F IGURE 13 The spaciousness for the hospital bed
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the EC in less time due to its faster linear and angular speed. By
contrast, hazard 3 had the biggest effect on the IVEV of the EC
compared to the other devices. This hazard blocked the nearest
available exit, E4, forcing the EC to find an alternative route from
R10, R14, R15 and R16. Since E4 was unusable for the RS and HB
in the absence of hazards, alternative routes did not need to be
found and the IVEVs of these devices were not affected (other
than the aforementioned trapping of the HB in R16). An example
of the route alteration for the EC as a result of hazard 3 can be
seen in Figure 17 when compared to the route taken from the
same location in the base case in Figure 15. This hazard increased
the egress time for the EC from the location in Figure 15 by 75%.
F IGURE 14 Egress time, IRSET and IVEV for all three devices for hazard 0 (no hazards). A, Egress time for hazard 0. B, IRSET for hazard
0 with red risk zone threshold at 150 seconds. C, IVEV for for hazard 0 with amber risk zone threshold at 0.7. IRSET, individual required safe
egress time; IVEV, individual value of emergency vulnerability
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As the next nearest exit, E3, was much farther from the affected
rooms, the alternative routes were much longer than routes in the
base case.
To determine the risk zones for each room for each device, the mIR-
SET and aIVEV were calculated. These values with the corresponding risk
zone thresholds are given in Figure 18. The results obtained from HEPTAD
suggested that all 16 rooms were identified as green risk zones for a patient
requiring the use of an EC. By contrast, only 5 rooms were identified as
green risk zones for the RS (R1, R3, R8, R9 and R10) and 11 rooms were
green risk zones for the HB (R1, R2, R3, R4, R6, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12 and
R13). The risk zone colouring for the devices are given in Figure 19 (EC),
Figure 20 (RS) and Figure 21 (HB). Based on these colourings, hospital or
ward managers should not place patients who require the use of a device
in the red risk zones for that device. This means that bedridden patients
who cannot be transferred to another assistance device must be placed in
the green risk zones for the HB. Further analysis would be required to take
into account other evacuating populations before a distribution of these
patients in the green risk zones can be determined.
During full evacuations of large multi-storey hospitals, patients on
higher floors will have to be taken down several stories to reach an
external exit. The HB will likely perform much worse than vertical
assistance devices in these scenarios as it cannot be taken down stair-
ways and lifts must be used where available. This would greatly
increase the egress time for a HB, particularly in the event of a lift fail-
ure. The Health Technical Memorandum 05-02 7 states that these
events should only occur ‘if a fire cannot be controlled within the
space of origin and there is additional risk to occupants outside of the
fire compartment of origin’ and are therefore very rare. However,
bedridden patients on higher floors may have a significant risk of not
evacuating within the ASET if a full evacuation were to occur.
Restricting bedridden patients to the ground floor (or a floor with an
external exit) would reduce their vulnerability in these situations.
For the base case, the egress time and IVEV for all devices were lower
in rooms nearer exits, which was as expected. Also, larger rooms tended to
have a lower IVEV than smaller rooms with a similar egress time. This was
due to the larger spaciousness and isovist values. When hazards were
introduced, the mIRSET and aIVEV of both devices increased for rooms
that were both near the hazard and where the hazard was between the
room and the nearest exit. In addition, larger devices generally gave smaller
spaciousness values and the more constrained a device (spatially or kine-
matically) the larger the egress time. Hence, the model predictions for this
simple example were in line with informed expectations.
6 | DISCUSSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The test case demonstrates that HEPTAD can estimate the egress
time of assistance devices from each location in the geometry in the
absence of other moving entities by finding viable routes based on
their spatial and kinematic constraints. Using these results, the tool
can also determine the areas of the geometry that are inappropriate
F IGURE 15 Egress routes from same start configuration (top right of geometry facing south) of the evacuation chair, rescue sheet and
hospital bed. Start position marked with blue cross, device position and orientation along the route shown as onion skinning of its shape in grey
and direction of the route marked with red arrows. A, Evacuation chair. B, Rescue sheet. C, Hospital bed
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for patients with specific mobility requirements (red and amber risk
zones). Since the risk zones produced by HEPTAD currently do not
take into account other evacuating occupants, they should not
alone be used to determine a distribution of patients throughout a
hospital that meets the ASET requirements. Although patients
should be restricted to green risk zones, as currently HEPTAD does
not take into consideration the impact of other occupants during
the evacuation, the results from HEPTAD should be used in combi-
nation with other methods (such as hand calculation tools or evacu-
ation simulation models) to determine the most appropriate areas
within these zones to accommodate patients with specific mobility
requirements.
F IGURE 16 Bar charts showing the difference between IVEV with no hazard (IVEV(0)) and IVEV with hazard n active (IVEV(n)) for each room
and each device. A, Increase in IVEV caused by hazard 1. B, Increase in IVEV caused by hazard 2. C, Increase in IVEV caused by hazard 3. D,
Weighted (by probability) average increase in IVEV. IVEV, individual value of emergency vulnerability
JOYCE ET AL. 15
The test case also demonstrates that patients who require different
assistance devices experience a different level of risk for the same
room and scenario. This is due to the different spatial and kinematic
constraints of devices which influence the available viable egress routes
for each device. This difference in routes, as seen in Figure 15, high-
lights the importance of accurately representing these constraints as
routes that are available to some devices will not be available to others.
This becomes even clearer when considering that an exit (E4) was
inaccessible to the RS and HB but accessible to the EC despite the exit
failing to meet code compliance.7,21 This difference in accessibility is
consistent with research concerning the Royal Marsden hospital evacu-
ation where it was found that staff utilising rescue sheets had difficulty
manoeuvring the devices through non-compliant doorways.2 Compliant
evacuation routes within a hospital geometry are likely (though not
guaranteed) to be accessible to any assistance device. This is evidenced
by HEPTAD producing green risk zones for all devices in R3, R8, R9,
F IGURE 17 Egress route taken by EC from the top right of the geometry differs from that in Figure 15 when hazard 3 is active
F IGURE 18 Bar charts showing the mIRSET and aIVEV values for each room and each device. A, mIRSET with red risk zone threshold at
150 seconds. B, aIVEV with amber risk zone threshold at 0.7. EC, evacuation chair; mIRSET, maximum individual required safe egress time; aIVEV,
averaged individual value of emergency vulnerability
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R10 and the main corridor. These are the only areas in the geometry
that have compliant evacuation routes. This difference in accessibility
shows that HEPTAD can detect viable yet incompliant evacuation
routes within a geometry that would currently be avoided by assistance
devices. Furthermore, HEPTAD can be used to identify viable egress
routes for assistance devices in other building types that may be sub-
ject to less restrictive building code requirements.
Kinematic constraints of assistance devices affect the way in
which they can follow a viable route. For example, in Figure 15, the
HB (a holonomic device) moves through R10 without rotating and
only rotates once it reaches the corridor. This contrasts
the movement of the other (non-holonomic) devices from the same
room and may explain why HEPTAD predicted that the HB would use
a different door to the RS when leaving R10 for the same exit. HEP-
TAD highlights that a less spatially and kinematically constrained
device will generally perform better in an evacuation.
When hazards are incorporated, the IVEV of a room is only
affected if a device passes through the location of the hazard while
following the egress route from that room in the base case. This
means that each hazard has the largest influence on the IVEVs of
nearby rooms and this influence depends on the length of an alterna-
tive route. Areas near an exit are, generally, the farthest from an alter-
native exit. This means if an exit is blocked by a hazard, the areas near
this exit will experience the greatest increase in egress time and,
therefore, IVEV.
As a result of the research carried out in this article, the following
recommendations are made for various stakeholders involved in evac-
uation management:
• For HECs: To improve evacuation efficiency, careful consideration
should be given to the allocation of patients to rooms. This must
take into consideration the patients' mobility requirements to
F IGURE 19 Risk zone colouring for the evacuation chair
F IGURE 20 Risk zone colouring for the rescue sheet
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ensure that an evacuation using the appropriate assistance device
is feasible from their location. In addition, both primary and alter-
native evacuation routes must be determined for each patient
using an appropriate device.
• For assistance device manufacturers: Design goals should be to
maximise the manoeuvrability of the device by minimising its con-
straints. This can be by ensuring there is no minimum turning
radius (it can turn on the spot) and it is holonomic (the possible
directions of movement do not depend on the direction it is facing)
as well as reducing the size as much as possible with no protru-
sions that may hinder its movement. In addition, more details about
the performance of the device should be provided (such as in
Table 2) by carrying out independent studies with different demo-
graphics of participants.
• For egress model developers: Incorporate the relevant spatial and
kinematic constraints of assistance devices (and other objects)
into simulation models as these influence the movement of
devices and the movement of others who are evacuating with
devices.
Although HEPTAD is designed primarily for use in hospitals, it can
be applied to any building that utilises assistance devices. This is par-
ticularly useful for determining egress routes through buildings types
with less restrictive building codes such as residential buildings and
office blocks. In addition, any moveable object whose properties can
be empirically established (as in Table 2), such as vehicles, luggage and
moveable furniture, can be represented using the methods presented
here. The tool can also be used to test and identify potential issues
with new concept assistance devices for application in existing hospi-
tal buildings once the properties of the device can be established. It is
hoped that the methods used here will enable egress model devel-
opers to extend the capabilities of their models to include any move-
able object that may be applicable in different scenarios and
geometries.
7 | CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This research has demonstrated that the spatial constraints (size and
shape) and kinematic constraints (maximum speeds, turning radius
and holonomicity) of movement assistance devices may adversely
impact the viability of certain egress routes in a hospital geometry.
These constraints potentially limit evacuation options and, as a result,
increase egress times associated with devices. Despite this, current
egress models have been unable to represent many of the constraints
of movement assistance devices and therefore are likely to produce
over-optimistic qualitative and quantitative predictions. The HEPTAD
software has represented a step forward in the development of egress
models by demonstrating how these constraints could be incorpo-
rated utilising methods from fields of study outside of fire safety engi-
neering (primarily autonomous robotics).
As well as demonstrating the functionality of the theoretical
models, HEPTAD itself can be used by Hospital Emergency Coordina-
tors (HECs) to aid in evacuation planning, staff training and live route
finding during real evacuations. HEPTAD can do this by identifying
viable routes for movement assistance devices throughout an arbi-
trarily complex building layout while taking into account the device
constraints. In addition, the software can classify areas of the hospital
geometry into risk zones without the need to run separate simulations
of the movement of such devices from every start location. These risk
zones provide information to HECs that can be utilised during the
design phase of building construction or when deciding on the posi-
tioning of different wards within an existing hospital building. This
enables HECs to take into account the selection of movement assis-
tance devices that are appropriate for the mobility requirements of
each patient that may occupy a ward. This may reduce the risk of allo-
cating patients to beds from which they cannot be evacuated within a
safe egress time.
Future work is needed to incorporate stairways into the model and
increase the number of movement directions from 8 to 16 allowing for
F IGURE 21 Risk zone colouring for the hospital bed
18 JOYCE ET AL.
a finer fidelity in the movement of assistance devices. In addition, an
ability to represent the interactions between movement assistance
devices and other occupants is underdevelopment. Once this new capa-
bility is developed, HEPTAD will be merged with the EXODUS egress
model allowing the combined software to represent the interaction of
arbitrary moveable objects such as assistance devices, vehicles and lug-
gage within the general evacuation flow. Although these methods could
also be utilised to represent moveable obstacles, such as debris and fur-
niture, further research is needed to determine how occupants interact
with these obstacles during an evacuation to allow for a representation
of a dynamic geometry in simulation models.
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